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
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Acronyms

AECID	<i>Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo</i> (Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation)	GIZ	<i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH</i> , Germany (German Corporation for International Cooperation)
AFD	Agence Française de Développement (French Development Agency)	IDDRSI	IGAD Drought Disasters Resilience Sustainability Initiative
ARC	African Risk Capacity, The African Union	IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
AGIR	<i>Alliance Globale pour l'Initiative Résilience</i> (Global Alliance for Resilience)	IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa
BRACED	Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters	LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany	MS	Member States of the European Union (EU)
CEDEAO	<i>Communauté Economique Des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest</i> (French acronym for ECOWAS)	NAIPs	National Agricultural Investment Programmes
CILSS	<i>Comité permanent Inter-états de la Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel</i> (Permanent Interstates Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel)	NRP	National Resilience Priorities
CCRIF	Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility	OECD	National Resilience Priorities
DAC	Development Cooperation Directorate, OECD (DCD-DAC)	PCRAFI	Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative
DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, European Commission	PRP	<i>Priorités Résilience Pays</i> (Countries' Resilience Priorities), AGIR
DFATD	Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Canada	PTFP	Platform of Technical and Financial Partners, AGIR
DfID	Department for International Development, UK Government	RPCA	<i>Réseau de Prévention des Crises Alimentaires</i> (OECD Food Crisis Prevention Network)
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department	RSA	Resilience Systems Analysis
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	SWAC	Sahel and West Africa Club, OECD
ENN	Emergency Nutrition Network	TFP	Technical and Financial Partners
EU	European Union	UEMOA	<i>Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine</i> (West African Economic and Monetary Union)
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
		UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
		USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Summary



This short, desk-based study provides a first exploration of the interconnections between resilience and nutrition, as evidenced in the guidance of six international donors (Canada, the EU, Germany, Ireland, the UK, and the USA) and the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development¹). It examines whether donors' thinking and approaches on resilience have impacted on their thinking and approaches on nutrition (or could do so in future) and how hard-won lessons from the nutrition sector can be of value to those working for increased resilience. It concludes by setting out potential next steps.

Understanding Resilience

Resilience is fundamentally about transformation – changing the very basis on which individuals and households can make decisions that influence their capacity to deal with stresses and shocks. Resilience is not only a programming concern; it is also a political concern that has become part of the global agenda. Resilience is seen as a way of shifting international aid away from repeated humanitarian responses to address fundamental vulnerabilities and thus help achieve lasting impact.

The nutrition community has been slow to engage with this international agenda (compared to other disciplines such as livelihoods, social protection and climate change). This is significant given the challenges that the nutrition community has faced in developing nutrition-sensitive, integrated programmes. Working through a resilience paradigm might have provided new insights into how more comprehensive nutrition interventions could be achieved.

The way resilience is understood across the donors included in this study is quite consistent: encompassing the ability of people or institutions to deal with shocks; entailing timeliness and timing; and spanning all levels from individual to state. Some common resilience 'qualities' also emerge which echo other norms to which the donors have signed up (such as on aid effectiveness, accountability, partnership and humanitarian action).

Most donors conceive resilience as an approach to programming rather than a definitive set of interventions.

The approach rests on comprehensive analysis of the shocks and stresses poor people are exposed to, their capacities to respond to these shocks, and the impact that can be expected on their livelihoods and wellbeing. These elements are seen as the foundations of resilience-building approaches.

Several donors cite specific benefits of resilience in helping to bridge areas of work that are often divided or siloed. This was most strongly felt in relation to bridging humanitarian and development endeavours and to connecting sectors and disciplines (and thereby driving the multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder characteristics of resilience-building approaches).

Funding

The majority of resilience-building efforts are funded through existing mechanisms. Only two new financing mechanisms for resilience were identified among the donors included in this study, and both come from the EU (EU Trust Funds for Africa (€1.8 billion) and for the Central African Republic (€10 million)).

Governments identified national risk-pooling mechanisms such as ARC (African Risk Capacity) as especially useful. A form of insurance against climate-related shocks, these can provide liquidity to governments in the immediate aftermath of an event and do not have strings attached (which can be a concern with official development assistance).

All donors have used both development and humanitarian funding to support resilience-building efforts, with an increasing proportion coming from development. In the EU, for example, between 15% and 25% of European Development Fund country allocations (2014-2020) will be devoted to resilience-related initiatives. BMZ is the only donor with a resilience-specific budget line (the Transitional Development Assistance), although BMZ has yet to develop an institutional policy on the subject.

Whether resilience has helped to increase funding for nutrition is not something that can be answered by this study.

¹ This is a government forum, currently composed of 34 members, to enable experiences to be shared and solutions found to common problems. See www.oecd.org.

Monitoring

Metrics used by donors to monitor their resilience investments vary widely: USAID has identified four top-line measures, including wasting; DfID's approach is to identify context-specific indicators; ECHO has developed a marker to track the degree to which resilience has been considered in all its projects; while the World Bank and UNDP use a range of development indices and thereby capture resilience as a means of effective development and not the *result* of it.

Linkages between resilience and nutrition

On the whole, donors regard nutrition as both a driver for, and an outcome of, resilience. USAID, DfID and the EU have explicitly linked nutrition and resilience, in different ways: USAID has embedded nutrition firmly within its monitoring of resilience work; DfID has produced a thoughtful paper calling for 'risk-proofing' nutrition programmes; and the EU has created a connection in both directions in its policies on nutrition and resilience.

Furthermore, USAID, DfID and Irish Aid identify the need to work on addressing the underlying determinants of undernutrition while also managing peaks in demand for treatment services. Having said that, it is also worth noting that a distinct feature of many population groups targeted by resilience efforts is persistently high levels of wasting, thus rendering 'acute' undernutrition as a chronic stress in these areas.

Several commonalities are identified between nutrition and resilience: seeking to address causes of problems across all layers of society (from individual to population); seeking comprehensive solutions to problems that require orchestrated efforts across disciplines; the need for flexibility and responsiveness to deal with new or worse stresses; and an emphasis on a long-term approach where gender equality and gender empowerment are key drivers of change.

There are also differences between the two that could be mutually advantageous for nutrition and resilience planning:

- One of the criticisms levelled at the resilience discourse is that it has been overly dominated by a 'systems approach' and has paid too little attention to the human angle of weak resilience. By viewing resilience through a nutrition lens, the interconnections between people and systems not only become evident but also become evidently necessary. Causal analysis of undernutrition makes explicit the interconnections between systems and individuals: undernutrition being a negative impact on individuals resulting from systems failures.

- Nutrition can inform resilience thinking by bringing new insights to the three resilience capacities (absorptive, adaptive and transformative).
- Although undernutrition is regarded as a key determinant of vulnerability (and thus weak resilience), the nutrition sector has tended to address the different forms of undernutrition separately. Resilience might help to overcome this barrier by focusing on the interplay of causal determinants of undernutrition in crisis or fragile contexts rather than on the final manifestation (wasting or stunting), thereby engendering more holistic approaches. So, while nutrition brings a strong people focus, a resilience approach moves towards a whole-system perspective to addressing vulnerabilities and capacity gaps.
- Similarly, a resilience approach could strengthen nutrition-sensitive programming by encouraging examination of all levels of potential causal pathways (and not just those at the immediate and underlying levels, as has been the tendency until recently).

The paper cautions against the isolation of 'nutrition resilience' as a distinct approach and argues that greater benefits would emerge through integration: integrating nutrition into resilience thinking, and resilience thinking informing nutrition programming.

Potential next steps

This study is seen as the beginning of an exploration into the linkages between nutrition and resilience; further discussion and study may be warranted and several avenues for each of these are identified.

For the nutrition community, it would be useful to secure a degree of alignment among agencies working in both the development and humanitarian arenas regarding core nutrition elements that could be integrated in resilience efforts.

For the donor community, it would be useful to consider their role in supporting both facets of strengthened nutrition/resilience linkages – how nutrition could strengthen resilience and how resilience could strengthen nutrition. In particular:

- a) systematically building multi-hazard risk assessments into programmes;
- b) requiring the undertaking of sound causal and context analyses (especially in spanning all levels of causality for undernutrition); which should then inform:
- c) more holistic approaches to undernutrition (and less differentiation between stunting and wasting);
- d) longer-term, more flexible funding;
- e) consideration of how nutrition indices could illuminate understanding of resilience capacities at individual, household and population levels; and
- f) greater attention on the outcomes of programmes rather than outputs.

Background

This scoping study begins to explore the actual and potential connections between resilience and nutrition. It purposefully focuses on donors, since they were the main drivers of the resilience agenda historically. In particular it focuses on the policy-level analysis of donor behaviour, structures and systems. It does not provide detailed insights into the programmes supported by the various donors covered, nor does it cover all donors.

The study examines whether donor thinking and approaches on resilience have impacted on their thinking and approaches on nutrition – or whether they could do. It seeks to assess whether the relationship between resilience and nutrition has something to offer

to donors and policymakers and whether further work on the linkages might be warranted.

Why the ENN?

The ENN has a strong track record in and is respected for “making available high quality evidence-based reviews and research on key and emerging questions on nutrition in emergencies.”² The issue of resilience emerged in the aid discourse and the ENN questioned its relevance and link to nutrition. It sought to start to answer this question by building on previous work it had undertaken on the financing of nutrition programmes³, hence the focus on donors to scope the broad policy and funding environment in order to determine the potential merit of exploring programme experience in more detail.

Methodology

The work was undertaken by a team of three. It was led by Lola Gostelow, with specific contributions on the Sahel from Gwénola Desplats in Dakar and on the Horn of Africa from Peter Hailey in Nairobi. The work was overseen by the ENN’s Jeremy Shoham.

This was a desk-based exercise, involving interviews (Annex 1) and review of documents (Annex 2).

The study focused mainly on six donors (Canadian DFATD, the UK’s DfID, the European Union, Irish Aid, Germany (GIZ and BMZ), and USAID) and the OECD. A small number of national government staff was also interviewed, plus independent ‘thinkers’.

The choice of donors was based on their known interest in both nutrition and resilience, findings from a broader review of documents, and the identification of suitable interviewees and their availability.

The connection between resilience and nutrition was examined in relation to the following questions:

- i. What does resilience in general mean to donors? How has the resilience agenda changed donor behaviour? (i.e. in terms of what is funded, how it is funded, funding time-scales and funding amounts).
- ii. How has this impacted nutrition? Has it changed how donors view undernutrition in all its forms (stunting, wasting and micronutrient deficiency)? Has it changed donor responses to undernutrition? Has it influenced performance monitoring or impact evaluation?
- iii. How should this experience inform the evolution of resilience thinking and practice? Does the concept of ‘nutritional resilience’ have value?

² *Evaluation of the Emergency Nutrition Network (ENN). Executive Summary.* Mokoro Limited, 15 September 2015, page 4. [http://files.ennonline.net/attachments/2397/ENN_EVAL-Mokoro-Final-Summary\(Sep2015\).pdf](http://files.ennonline.net/attachments/2397/ENN_EVAL-Mokoro-Final-Summary(Sep2015).pdf)

³ *Managing acute malnutrition at scale: A review of donor and government financing arrangements.* ODI Network Paper No.75, May 2013. <http://www.ennonline.net/mamatscale>

Findings

General

Resilience is not just another fad. It is a political issue and has, in less than a decade, become part of a global agenda:

- It is one of the proposed targets for the first Sustainable Development Goal⁴ on ending poverty;
- It is integral to the Sendai Framework⁵; and
- It is writ large in the draft 'Bosporus Compact' under preparation in the context of the much-anticipated World Humanitarian Summit in 2016⁶.

Thus the attention given to resilience is likely to last at least for the next 15 years and possibly longer.

To a large extent, resilience is a donor construct. Most interviewees – even those from national governments – referred to resilience emerging out of growing donor concerns that 'business as usual' was not good enough; that recurring humanitarian responses to the same populations was not effective; and that a profound shift was needed to deploy international resources to better effect. In this, they revealed the deep belief that the international system needs to find a way of achieving lasting impact. The crises in Niger of 2005⁷ and the Sahel of 2008 were cited time and again as key wake-up calls that it was time to make this shift.

In addition there is a sense that resilience is politically palatable as it promotes future-looking thinking rather than retrospective evaluation of progress. As such, it is said to have enabled more successful dialogue between donors and national governments about development in sensitive and fragile contexts, compared to fragility analysis⁸.

The nutrition community has been slow to engage with this international agenda. The IFPRI conference in 2014 (*Building Resilience for Food and Nutrition Security*⁹) is one significant landmark; this apart, there have been only a relatively small number of resilience publications explicitly concerned with nutrition¹⁰ and perhaps even fewer programming examples¹¹. In contrast, other disciplines such as livelihoods, social protection and climate change appear to have been quicker in identifying the potential value of resilience.

This is significant given the attention, efforts and challenges that the nutrition community has faced, and continues to face, in developing nutrition-sensitive, integrated programmes. One would have thought that a resilience framework might have shed new insights into how more comprehensive nutrition interventions could be achieved.

Current thinking on resilience among donors

Annex 3 provides an overview of what donors have in place regarding resilience.

The definitions of resilience among the six donors are captured in the 'word cloud' shown on the cover of this report. Some common attributes can be seen:

- resilience as encompassing ability to deal with shocks or stresses;
- resilience as spanning multiple levels, from the individual, household, community through to the country and beyond
- resilience as entailing timeliness and timing (for example, recovering quickly while protecting long-term interests).

The 'ability' dimension of resilience is pretty much universally understood as encompassing three types of capacity: absorptive, adaptive and transformative. These are typically analysed across the (multiple) layers of organisation – from household, village, livelihood group through to government institutions and governance systems. A resilience approach requires that all three capacities be assessed in order to determine the weakest links that require strengthening.

⁸ Fragility analysis is used in the 'New Deal' signed by 38 countries at the Busan Forum on Aid Effectiveness. It outlines five goals for engagement in fragile states. Fragility analysis is part of the process of engagement, but requires sign-off by parliament; this makes it very sensitive politically.

⁹ <http://www.2020resilience.ifpri.info/>

¹⁰ See for example: FAO's Strengthening the Links Between Resilience and Nutrition in Food and Agriculture; ACF's Enhancing Climate Resilience and Food & Nutrition Security; or WFP's Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition; or UNICEF's Nutrition Resilience in Kenya: A Policy Brief, June 2015.

¹¹ As an example of this slow pace, a recent analysis of UNICEF Kenya Programme Cooperation Agreements with ten INGOs reveals that resilience featured explicitly since 2014, and then only in one NGO's PCA (Peter Hailey, personal communication).

This begins to distinguish resilience from other approaches, which tend to home in on one of these capacities. For example, disaster risk reduction (DRR) is primarily concerned with increasing absorptive capacities; climate-change and alternative livelihoods are about adaptive capacities; and system-strengthening, social protection and governance investments are about transformative capacities. Resilience provides a much broader framework, encompassing all these capacities.

Common 'resilience qualities'

Four of the donors have articulated qualities for their resilience work that converge around the following (see Annex 4 for details):

- Appropriate – to the population and the conditions of each place;
- People-centred – responsive to their priorities;
- Country-owned – not imposed but supporting national strategies whenever possible;
- Relevant – in terms of timeliness, a long-term perspective and flexibility;
- Equitable – in supporting the most vulnerable people; and
- Connected – across sectors, players and disciplines.

These are the same donors that have made an organisational commitment to building resilience across their aid portfolios. The resilience qualities can be seen as mirroring other norms that the organisations prioritise, such as the Principles of the Paris Declaration¹³ (cf. 'Country-owned'); Principles on Accountability¹⁴ (cf. 'Appropriate' and 'People-centred'); Principles of Partnership¹⁵ (cf. 'Connected'); and Humanitarian Principles¹⁶ (cf. 'Equitable').

Donor policies and guidance

Half of the donors interviewed (DfID, EU, USAID) have policies and/or strategies on resilience. The absence of policy guidance among the others (i.e. Canadian DFATD, BMZ, and Irish Aid) is not indicative of an absence of interest in resilience, but each is going through an internal process of reflection and learning. For example, Irish Aid has identified resilience as one of its three goals in its policy for international development and BMZ has set in motion a Resilience Learning Initiative to explore lessons from five projects in three countries.

Resilience as a process

Most interviewees recognised resilience as a process or an approach and resisted attempts to 'projectise' it.

IrishAid, for example, is exploring resilience from the understanding that it needs to be considered throughout its aid portfolio. For the EU, "Resilience shall not be understood as an isolated objective but as an integral

Resilience Capacities Defined¹²

Absorptive capacity: The ability of a system to prepare for, mitigate or prevent negative impacts, using predetermined coping responses in order to preserve and restore essential basic structures and functions. This includes coping mechanisms used during periods of shock.

Adaptive capacity: The ability of a system to adjust, modify or change its characteristics and actions to moderate potential future damage and to take advantage of opportunities, so that it can continue to function without major qualitative changes in function or structural identity.

Transformative capacity: The ability to create a fundamentally new system so that the shock will no longer have any impact. This can be necessary when ecological, economic or social structures make the existing system untenable.

part of the poverty reduction and lifesaving aims of the EU's external assistance" (EU Action plan, page 3). Guidance from AECID on international aid from the Spanish government frames resilience in terms of protecting the rights of vulnerable populations and seeking to avoid potential negative effects of shocks¹⁸.

All donors underscored the importance of comprehensive risk analyses in informing resilience-building programmes. The shocks and/or stresses experienced by a particular population group and the existing capacities to respond to these are seen as the foundations of resilience-building programmes. Another commonality among donors is the understanding that resilience requires the engagement of multiple types of actors, across multiple sectors and disciplines.

Resilience as a 'bridging' construct

Several donors cite explicit benefits of resilience in bridging disciplines and sectors. "Resilience as a common goal has the potential to bring together humanitarians, stabilisation and development actors;

¹² OECD (2014) *Guidelines for resilience systems analysis*, OECD Publishing. Pages 6-7. <http://www.oecd.org/dac/Resilience%20Systems%20Analysis%20FINAL.pdf>

¹³ <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm>

¹⁴ <http://www.hapinternational.org/pool/files/principles-of-accountability-and-members-poster-english-jan-2010.pdf>

¹⁵ https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/ROWCA/Coordination/Principles_of_Partnership_GHP_July2007.pdf

¹⁶ <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/64zahh.htm>

¹⁷ *One World One Future. Ireland's Policy for International Development; and its Framework for Action (2013-2017)*.

¹⁸ Plan Director de la Cooperación Española 2013 / 2016. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.

actors working on disaster risk reduction, conflict prevention and climate change; and others working on social, economic and institutional development.¹⁹ Arguably, resilience *requires* that such bridging takes place because it requires a holistic approach.

Such bridging plays out most prominently among the donors included in this study in two areas: across the humanitarian/development arenas and across sectors and disciplines.

Bridging humanitarian and development endeavours

Resilience seems to have succeeded where other bridging constructs (such as LRRD [linking relief, rehabilitation and development] or the continuum model)²⁰ have failed. Whereas LRRD was often applied as a transition between one form of international assistance to another, *“Resilience is about rebalancing, not merging, the two sectors by looking at [their] comparative advantage”*. In the EU, for example, resilience seems to have been accepted as a responsibility by DEVCO in a way that LRRD and DRR (being seen as a responsibility of ECHO) have not. However this has also generated tensions. For example, some within the EU feel that resilience is simply a response to failed development and as such should not be funded by ECHO – *“ECHO is about humanitarian action, and should not be trapped into humanitarian substitution for the lack of action by development”*.

Some donors have not felt that resilience has helped to bridge humanitarian and development assistance. For Canada, DRR is perceived as a more effective bridge across government departments. This is equally true for the German government, where international development assistance through BMZ remains largely

distinct from humanitarian assistance through the Federal Foreign Office.

The majority of interviewees valued resilience in bringing much needed attention to the phenomenon of ‘perpetual crisis’ and the imperative to fundamentally change the aid model that has relied on recurrent humanitarian response that does little to address the underlying factors that predispose populations to crisis.

Bridging sectors and disciplines

Government interviewees were particularly positive about the benefits brought by the resilience agenda in helping to break down ministerial and sectoral silos. For example, in Burkina Faso, resilience (through AGIR) has reportedly strengthened inter-ministerial planning, while in Niger cross-sectoral (and ministerial) coordination was said to have improved.

Similar benefits were cited by some donors. For the EU, resilience-building needs to be shaped by a range of disciplines, from food and nutrition security to state-building and conflict prevention²¹. DfID also identifies numerous domains, from the political to the technological, as relevant to resilience. Irish Aid sees resilience linkages across all seven of its priority areas of action to support implementation of its international development policy, especially global hunger, climate change and humanitarian action.

¹⁹ OECD – What does “Resilience” Mean for Donors? page 1.

²⁰ The LRRD model is basically concerned with connecting short-term humanitarian relief (funding and programmes) with longer-term development assistance. The continuum model went further, seeking complementarities in the objectives and approaches of humanitarian and development aid. For further discussion see Relationship between humanitarian and development aid by Róisín Hinds, February 2015. <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/HDQ1185.pdf>

²¹ See ECHO Action Plan, page 4.

Donor practices around resilience

Institutionalised arrangements

The institutional impetus for resilience varies. For some donors, resilience emerged from evaluations or reviews of their international humanitarian assistance (as in the case of Canada and DfID, for example); for others (such as the EU) it fulfilled a long-standing need for coherence across its humanitarian and development portfolios; for others still, resilience resonates with core values and approaches (such as Irish Aid and BMZ).

The most striking example of a donor structural response to resilience comes from USAID. At headquarters level a Resilience Leadership Council²² has been established, which signals resilience as an institutional priority. It has power to leverage funding from all bureaus. Structural changes have also been made at the regional and country levels, where USAID established Joint Planning Cells (JPCs) for multi-sector, humanitarian/development joint decisions on the investments needed to build resilience. Feedback from the Sahel shows clear added value of the JPCs at the planning stages of operations.

An example of a donor process response to resilience comes from DfID, which sought to institutionalise resilience by 'embedding' it in country-level plans. Over a three-year process (2012-2015), 25 country offices developed Disaster Resilience Strategies bringing a variable degree of attention to, and accountability for, resilience efforts. Moreover, since the embedding of resilience was integrated into DfID's Strategic Review Process, and thus became an institutional commitment, DfID as whole was accountable for this (to the Cabinet Office).

Financing mechanisms

The general practice across the donors is to use whichever existing mechanism is most appropriate. Only two new financing mechanisms were identified among the donors included in this study and both come from the EU (see Annex 5 for more details). The mechanisms are both EU Trust Funds: one applied at country level in the Central African Republic (€10 million); the other at a continental level for Africa, covering the Sahel, Horn and North Africa (€1.8 billion)²³.

A new financing mechanism for resilience is under consideration in DfID for possible rollout in 2016. No further details were available at the time of writing.

Insurance

Although not new, one mechanism that government interviewees mentioned more often than donors is risk-pooling, such as ARC, CCRIF and PCRAFI (see Annex 6 for a brief description of these). Risk-pooling mechanisms are seen as especially useful because they are rapid and can provide liquidity to governments in the immediate aftermath of a shock. They may be less useful, however, in response to protracted or extensive risk because of the way finances are triggered.

Government interviewees involved in ARC, for example, saw distinct advantages in having access to funds much earlier than would normally be possible through official development assistance and in having funds with no strings attached – governments are in full control.

Whether risk-pooling is advantageous to resilience is too early to tell. ARC indemnities were paid for the first time (to Mauritania, Niger and Senegal) only in January 2015. Although the mechanism was believed to have worked well, the implementation plans linked to the indemnities were more akin to disaster response than resilience-building.

Resilience funding

Most donors have multiple examples of funding aimed at 'building resilience'.

Most donors also see the importance of providing funding differently in order to support resilience-building: funding more flexibly and funding over longer time-frames.

Several donors support pooled-funding mechanisms, such as the World Bank-administered Pilot Programme on Climate Resilience (PPCR)²⁴.

²² The Resilience Leadership Council is co-chaired by the Bureau for Food Security (which includes the Feed the Future initiative) and the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) – which has nine offices, including the offices of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Food for Peace (FFP). Members of the council include leadership teams of all bureaus.

²³ The EU Trust Fund for Africa was launched on 9th September 2015: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5596_en.htm

²⁴ <http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/pilot-program-for-climate-resilience>

All donors have used both development and humanitarian funding to support resilience-building efforts, including:

- USAID refers to building coherence by “sequencing, layering, and integrating” its different funding streams and breaking down funding silos. Resilience work is funded by a wide range of initiatives, bureaus and offices within the Agency, including Feed the Future, Global Health, Food for Peace, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Global Climate Change and others.
- In the EU, most resilience funding comes from development. One important limitation cited is that ECHO funding is still disbursed according to 18-month agreements, which undermines the longer-term perspective required by resilience.
- DfID’s multi-year humanitarian funding in countries with protracted crises is seen as a progressive development. Evaluation of this approach is currently underway and will be of interest to a number of donors.
- IrishAid, in contrast, is mindful of feedback from its partner NGOs that reveals that, although most consider multi-year funding as beneficial, some consider it less flexible compared to annual funding that can be negotiated afresh at each round.
- BMZ is the only donor with a resilience-specific budget line. Transitional Development Assistance is a long-standing budget that aims at funding gaps between humanitarian and development assistance. It is anticipated that this budget will increase from 2016, although this likely reflects an overall increase in Germany’s development aid budget than with resilience per se.

Funding in general for resilience is significant. For example, between 15% and 25%²⁵ of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) country allocations will be devoted to resilience-related projects. €1.5 billion will be mobilised by the EU for resilience in West Africa between 2014 and 2020 (compared to €750 million for Eastern Africa)²⁶.

It is interesting to compare this figure to the EU’s response to the crisis in West Africa in 2012, where €1.2 billion was disbursed to nine countries; this equates to €300 million per year for prevention, compared to four times that for emergency response.

Whether resilience has helped to increase funding for nutrition is not something that can be answered by this study. ECHO interviewees did not think so; USAID discerns a shift in where nutrition funding comes from (more from development funding and less from humanitarian), but no change in the overall quantity.

Programming

Although this was not a focus of the present study,

donors were questioned about what resilience has changed in programming practice and what is happening now that wasn’t happening before. Is it possible to disentangle ‘good’ developmental approaches from specific resilience approaches? Similarly, is it possible to disentangle humanitarian responses to protracted crises from resilience approaches? The challenge for all donors has been to identify the specific added value that resilience brings beyond good developmental programming.

All donors interviewed struggled to answer these questions. As one interviewee put it: *“We believe in resilience, but how can we best deliver it?”* Examples were given of good resilience programmes (i.e. ones that had built-in flexibility to respond to shocks and stresses; that addressed chronic poverty and vulnerability and weren’t simply reacting to acute needs; and that started by doing a risk and vulnerability analysis to determine population and sectoral priorities), but there was no consistency in what constituted ‘good’ even within donor institutions, let alone across them. Several interviewees also observed a lack of rigour in resilience programming: *“There is a lot of repackaging and that’s frustrating”*.

Preliminary insights from BMZ’s Resilience Learning Initiative²⁷ point to two operational lessons: the first is about the importance of comprehensive context analysis that includes all potential risks (political, economic, climatic, food security, etc.); the second is the value of integrated, multi-sectoral programmes.

Linkages to livelihoods, social protection and cash programming were often referred to as key entry points for resilience-building efforts. Indeed, there seem to be few sectoral barriers to potential resilience programmes. DfID, for example, identifies potential entry points ranging from technological to political²⁸.

ECHO’s Compendium²⁹ of resilience projects also illustrates the very wide array of work included: some are

²⁵ EU Resilience Compendium, page 11.

²⁶ Examples of country allocations agreed in National Indicative Programmes for 2014-2020: Niger: €180 million to food security and resilience (30% of the NIP) (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/nip-niger-20140619_fr.pdf); Senegal: €105 million to agriculture and food security (53% of NIP), which includes resilience and nutrition (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/nip-senegal-edf11-2014_fr_0.pdf); Kenya: €190 million to food security and resilience to climate shocks in ASAL (45% of NIP) (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/nip-kenya-20140619_en.pdf); Ethiopia: €110 million to resilience and long-term nutrition (15% of NIP) (http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ethiopia/documents/press_corner/nip_11th_edf_ethiopia_signed.pdf)

²⁷ http://www.slideshare.net/wle_cgjar_media/strengthening-resilience-in-fragile-contextsgiz

²⁸ DfID, 2011 Defining Disaster Resilience: A DFID Approach Paper. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/186874/defining-disaster-resilience-approach-paper.pdf.

²⁹ EU Resilience Compendium. Saving lives and livelihoods, 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/resilience/eu_resilience_compendium_en.pdf

DRR-focused; some are linked to livelihoods; others are multi-sectoral. Of the 27 examples included, nine mention nutrition explicitly and only one makes reference to risk analysis.

The multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder characteristics often linked to resilience are evident in two regional initiatives that are supported by a number of donors:

- The AGIR alliance in West Africa: 17 countries in the region committed to work together over 20 years (2012-2032) to eliminate hunger and malnutrition by addressing the structural drivers behind the recurring crises affecting the region. (See Annex 7 for a detailed description.)
- The IGAD Drought Disasters Resilience Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI)³⁰ in East-Africa, which grew from the experience of the 2011 crisis in the Horn of Africa. The seven countries³¹ involved have each prepared a Country Programming Paper³² (sometimes entitled *Ending Drought Emergencies*), which identifies priority interventions for pastoralist and agro-pastoralist drought-prone areas. IDDRSI explicitly recognises the need for a “*comprehensive and holistic approach to combating chronic food and nutrition insecurity*”³³; includes nutrition security as one of the overall outcomes of the initiative³⁴; and identifies nutrition within the pillar on “livelihoods support and basic social services”³⁵. Thus nutrition is woven throughout the IDDRSI strategy – as a driver, as an input, and as an outcome.

Most interviewees view resilience more as a programming process than specific activities, with an emphasis on the analytics that guide programming.

The OECD is working on a tool to try to connect the analytics with operational practice. The tool is called Resilience Systems Analysis³⁶ (RSA; see below) and it is being piloted in six countries. It seeks to inform:

1. Analysis of risks and of how different layers of society can become more resilient to those risks;
2. Integration of resilience-building measures into new/existing programmes at the different layers;
3. Impact measurement by monitoring how the different layers are changed as a result.

The tool uses a livelihoods framework. Although this does not explicitly include nutrition, nutrition did emerge in the RSA in Somalia as a means of strengthening adaptive and transformative capacities.

Reporting

ECHO recently introduced³⁷ a Resilience Marker. It is the only donor currently monitoring resilience at the project level. Its purpose is to assess whether resilience has been considered in the design of projects (and not, it

OECD Resilience Systems Analysis

The RSA is a highly consultative tool. It requires joint analysis (government and other actors) of how different assets in each layer of the system (from community to government) will likely respond to identified risks, hazards and stresses; how current assets can be strengthened; and what the programming priorities are. This is then written in to a resilience road map (for humanitarian as well as development programmes).

The OECD uses a model of the different kinds of assets that communities need to ensure their overall wellbeing. These fall into six inter-linked groups: human capital, financial capital, natural capital, physical capital, social capital and political capital. These assets operate at all levels, from community to government, and all six are essential in ensuring that the overall system is resilient to future shocks.

ECHO Resilience Marker Criteria

- (1) Does the proposal include an adequate analysis of shocks, stresses and vulnerabilities?
- (2) Is the project risk-informed? Does the project include adequate measures to ensure it does not aggravate risks or undermine capacities?
- (3) Does the project include measures to build local capacities (beneficiaries and local institutions)?
- (4) Does the project take opportunities to support long-term strategies to reduce humanitarian needs, underlying vulnerability and risks?

was categorically stated, as a means of quantifying the proportion of projects that are building resilience). Every project proposal submitted to ECHO includes partners’ answers to four questions (see box)³⁸. These then determine an overall resilience mark for the project. This mark is then reassessed at the mid-term review, so that resilience becomes a tracker of project performance.

³⁰ <http://resilience.igad.int/>

³¹ Djibouti, Ethiopia Kenya, South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.

³² <http://resilience.igad.int/index.php/programs-projects/national>

³³ The IDDRSI Strategy, January 2013, page 9.

<http://resilience.igad.int/attachments/article/237/20131020%20IDDRSI%20Strategy%20Revised.pdf>

³⁴ Ibid, page 13

³⁵ Ibid, page 25

³⁶ The tool has been piloted in the DRC, Lebanon and Somalia, with further analyses planned in South Sudan, Sudan and Ethiopia. See <http://www.oecd.org/dac/risk-resilience.htm>

³⁷ The system was introduced as a pilot in January 2015 and became mandatory in June 2015.

³⁸ Resilience Marker, General Guidance (November 2014). Ref. Ares(2014)3883617 - 21/11/2014.

Some saw the marker as progress in monitoring whether the design of projects is changing and becoming more resilience-relevant; others saw it as a box-ticking exercise. Time will tell how the marker performs in practice. Interestingly, the OECD is exploring the potential benefit of introducing a resilience marker to the DAC system, although there has been significant donor opposition to the idea (due to a concern about not wanting to add more markers for single issues and a conceptual concern that the focus should not be about measuring resilience but about measuring wellbeing³⁹).

USAID uses four top-line measures⁴⁰ to assess the performance of its resilience programmes. These are derived from Feed the Future or Food for Peace baselines and other secondary sources:

- Number of people in need of humanitarian assistance (controlled for the severity of the crisis and for the way in which needs are assessed in different contexts);
- Mean depth of poverty⁴¹;
- Prevalence of moderate/severe hunger (i.e. household hunger scale score ≥ 2); and
- Prevalence of wasting in children under five years old.

DfID has also been exploring indicators to use in its resilience work and, in contrast to USAID, has determined not to use top-line measures. DfID argues

that the factors that influence the resilience of people or systems are very wide-ranging and highly context-specific, so identifying universal resilience indicators is not appropriate⁴². Instead, DfID assesses resilience at the outcome level of a project, as per the following theory of change:

“Without the programme, beneficiaries would have been less resilient to climate shocks and stresses (hazards); therefore, performance of development indicators (e.g. income, nutrition, deaths from climate-related disasters) would be worse than in the ‘with-programme’ scenario”⁴³.

³⁹ The OECD’s resilience systems analysis, discussed above, does not use nutrition in assessing wellbeing.

⁴⁰ https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/Technical%20Note_Measuring%20Resilience%20in%20USAID_June%202013.pdf

⁴¹ A function of the prevalence of poverty (% households below the poverty line) and the severity of poverty (the departure of the mean income of the poor from the poverty line).

⁴² This analysis was undertaken in the context of the BRACED programme funded by DfID through the International Climate Fund. See *Final Report: Assessing the impact of ICF programmes on household and community resilience to climate variability and climate change*. Nick Brooks, Eunica Aure, Martin Whiteside June 2014.

<http://www.evidenceondemand.info/assessing-the-impact-of-icf-programmes-on-household-and-community-resilience-to-climate-variability-and-climate-change>

⁴³ Ibid, page 38.

Discussion



This section draws together some of the threads that have emerged through this scoping study and argues that strengthening the linkages between nutrition and resilience will benefit both resilience and nutrition approaches.

What is the added value of resilience to donors?

Resilience as a construct has been driven primarily by donors as part of a political agenda to engage better in countries burdened by recurring crises, persistent conflict and weak governance. Resilience has helped to open (more) doors for dialogue with the governments of such countries, as well as informed programming.

Perhaps because it speaks to both the political and technical drivers of donor behaviour, the levels of institutional commitment to resilience among donors exceed those made for other constructs such as LRRD or the continuum model. One of the most important reasons, and consistent perceived benefits of resilience, is that it has helped to bridge institutional and conceptual barriers – across development and humanitarian departments and across sectoral disciplines.

This institutional commitment is evident in examples of both new structures (such as within USAID) intended to reform the way in which decisions about priorities and funding are made, and also new ways of working that seek to overcome institutional and bureaucratic barriers (as seen in some examples of DEVCO/ECHO cooperation

in the EU). While these changes are progressive, only time will tell whether they will transform donor behaviour. Can we expect coherent/uninterrupted funding in future? Or stronger explicit links between funding decisions and analysis of needs? Or greater consistency in how vulnerability is integrated into such decisions?

What is a resilience-building approach to programming?

Although donors viewed resilience as important as a forward-looking construct concerned fundamentally with social transformation, all face challenges in translating that into their approach to programming. No interviewee was able to define what ‘resilience-building’ looks like. Few criteria were found which donors consistently applied in their processes and decisions. Without a more thorough examination of programming practices, however, it is not a question that can be answered fully.

One can argue, and many have, that resilience programming is basically ‘good programming’: listening to communities about their constraints and priorities; taking account of the specific risks and challenges of a particular population group; harnessing the comparative advantages (capacities) of different actors; targeting population groups that are most vulnerable to the effects of acute shocks or chronic stresses; building their economic and physical capital to enable them to better withstand these effects; engendering government ownership; working through new and more diverse partnerships; and so on. All these attributes could be, and have been, put in place without a ‘resilience’ label. Indeed, several interviewees – donors and government personnel alike – identified resilience-relevant actions that predate the resilience agenda by several years (or even decades).

The findings from this scoping exercise reveal a perception from interviewees that resilience has changed the analytics that inform programmes and thus the process of delivering programmes, i.e. the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of programming rather than the ‘what’. Most notably, this has included:

- Risk analyses that include multiple hazards and stresses and the connections between them;
- Consultative enquiries forging links with a wider range of actors;
- More collaborative approaches, especially with governments, and reaching out to a wider set of constituents than would normally be the case.

However, according to one interviewee: *“The problem [with resilience] is not conceptual – it’s just that it’s really hard to do, to get over the institutional and mindset barriers. We’ve put up the obstacles that resilience is now trying to overcome”*.

Resilience is also hard because it needs to transcend typical aid programming to address structures and power relationships that determine vulnerability and thus risk. This requires long-term thinking and a deep understanding of the drivers of vulnerability to determine what changes are required. Resilience programmes need to address the problems and constraints that relate to individual or household or community vulnerability in a given setting.

Resilience also has the potential to influence how individual actors operate, as argued by Levine: “Agencies need to think of themselves not only as individual actors trying to optimise the way they work, but also as system players, actively trying to shape the way in which other agencies behave and relate to each other.”⁴⁴

It is debatable whether the resilience agenda has yet risen to this challenge. The ultimate test of change will be in how success is defined. Has resilience programming brought about a change in the outcomes achieved, even though the inputs invested may not be radically different? What impacts are emerging?

Evidence of linkages between resilience and nutrition in donor guidance

Several interviewees referred to the links between resilience and nutrition as a “no-brainer”: an essential contribution to the pathway between building the resilience of people and the resilience of societies and nations. Nutrition was typically seen as both a *driver for, and outcome of, resilience*.

USAID

The strongest links between nutrition and resilience are evident in USAID. Aside from having wasting as a top-line measure of resilience, stunting is also used in Feed the Future-funded work. Moreover, USAID programmatic pillars include human capital, which can comprise nutrition programmes. For example, in Kenya and Uganda, USAID is exploring how to scale up nutrition-sensitive interventions but in a way that builds in responsiveness to likely shocks.

Crisis modifiers are an important feature in USAID’s resilience efforts as a means of, on the one hand, building greater responsiveness in development cooperation to adapt to shocks or stresses; and on the other of incorporating developmental approaches in humanitarian responses. They appear to be used more in the Horn of Africa compared to West Africa. For example, in Ethiopia in 2011 and 2015, crisis modifiers allowed humanitarian assistance to incorporate asset

⁴⁴ Simon Levine in: <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8881.pdf>, p21.

protection (livestock) linked to value chains. In Senegal, USAID’s programme included crisis modifiers in development programmes, but reportedly these did not enable more timely response to shocks. Now being redesigned so that the crisis modifiers are more flexible (including built-in contingency funds) it is hoped that they will help to improve responsiveness in the future.

DfID

DfID guidance on nutrition and resilience calls for a nutrition-specific risk assessment to identify two potential avenues of intervention:

- “The structural drivers of nutritional risk that will need to be addressed through longer-term investments and policy change”; and
- “The specific impacts that shocks and hazards have that need to be prepared for or mitigated.”⁴⁵

While it may be the case that such thinking has informed nutrition programming, interviewees indicated that its impact on general resilience-building efforts has been limited. Any follow-up to this current scoping study could usefully analyse this in more detail to identify impediments to the take-up of this thinking.

USAID, Irish Aid and DfID identify the need to work at addressing the underlying determinants of undernutrition while also managing peaks in demand for curative services.

EU

The EU explicitly calls for nutrition/resilience linkages in both directions:

- “Systematic incorporation of resilience in food and nutrition security activities”⁴⁶; and
- “Integration of nutrition interventions within an overall resilience strategy.”⁴⁷


Such reinforcement is reportedly beginning to help move towards more holistic approaches to the EU’s nutrition thinking, if not yet its programming. For example, DEVCO is beginning to accept the relevance of wasting to its work, suggesting that: *“The only way to reduce acute malnutrition spikes is to reduce stunting”*.

⁴⁵ DfID 2011 Defining Disaster Resilience: A DFID Approach Paper. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/186874/defining-disaster-resilience-approach-paper.pdf.

⁴⁶ See page 10 of: Commission Staff Working Document: Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries, 2013-2020. Brussels 2013. http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/resilience/com_2013_227_ap_crisis_prone_countries_en.pdf

⁴⁷ See p14 of: Commission Staff Working Document: Addressing Undernutrition in Emergencies. Accompanying the document: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Enhancing maternal and child nutrition in external assistance: an EU policy framework. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013SC0072&from=EN>

Figure 1



What are the conceptual linkages between nutrition and resilience?

There are several conceptual similarities between nutrition and resilience: in seeking comprehensive approaches to problems; mobilising multiple sectors; and identifying the need to work at multiple levels. There is also an understanding among many donors that there is an implicit mutuality between nutrition and resilience: resilience-building programmes improve nutrition, and nutrition programmes strengthen resilience.

The causal framework for undernutrition has been annotated to highlight (on the left) how factors that cause undernutrition link to resilience; and (on the right) the causes of undernutrition as symptoms of weak resilience at individual, household and community levels.

While the nutrition community has benefited from having a common conceptual framework that has endured for over 25 years, the same cannot be said for resilience. The plethora of resilience frameworks developed in recent years has merely contributed to the lack of clarity and consistency in how the concept has been applied.

Three frameworks have been developed specifically to connect nutrition and resilience; by DfID, FAO and UNICEF (presented in Annex 8). The two by the UN agencies can be described as ‘instrumentalist’, designed to guide programming responses; the one by DfID is more analytical, concerned with how risks, working at different levels, contribute to undernutrition. These differences may simply reflect institutional priorities, but if they point to a conceptual differentiation they may be problematic. This is because of the risk that an instrumentalist connection between nutrition and resilience paves the way for a distinct approach, such as ‘nutrition resilience’ coined by UNICEF in Kenya.

This runs counter to the findings from this study, which highlight that donors are seeking ways of integrating nutrition into their resilience approaches (and vice versa), creating synergies and strengthening the analytical basis behind the investments made.

There also seem to be greater gains to be made by embedding nutrition within resilience, and benefiting from the political and programmatic attention resilience is receiving, than by isolating it as a distinct approach. There is a risk that distinguishing ‘nutritional resilience’ could be counter-productive in undermining the impetus to ensure that all nutrition efforts are conducive to resilience-building. If, as is argued here, there is value in designing actions to enhance the synergistic linkages between nutrition and resilience, when would it be appropriate not to do so? Shouldn’t all nutrition work be ‘nutritional resilience’ to some degree? The potential for such synergies is explored in the following two sections.

Social capital and power as mutual concerns of resilience and nutrition

Although not prominent in donor thinking about resilience, two issues emerged that are worth exploring a little further as they resonate strongly with concerns in nutrition. These are social capital and power.

Social capital

Social capital is understood as “networks, together with shared norms, values and understandings, that facilitate co-operation within or among groups”.⁴⁸ Social capital cuts across all three types of resilience capacity and works across the multiplicity of layers. There are three forms of social capital that bond individuals (through mutual care and support); that bridge groups that experience different hazards (typically in different locations); and that *link* individuals with those in positions of power who control resources that individuals or groups might need. These have been shown to be key drivers of resilience⁴⁹ as well as protecting and promoting nutrition⁵⁰.

Power

Power – and this relates to social capital – is succinctly explained by Simon Levine: *“We need to understand how and why different people are vulnerable, the constraints on their independent agency, opportunities for supporting change, the power relations that maintain vulnerability and that could potentially provide some way out of it, and how the political economy is likely to shape the outcomes of any intended intervention.”*⁵¹

The linkages between power and social capital have been explored from the perspective of communities’ understanding of resilience. Human capital emerged as a critical underlying driver, cause and outcome of vulnerability for all communities studied (see Annex 9 for a fuller account of this work). In order to strengthen their resilience and become more empowered, communities prioritised changes in areas mainly located at the levels of basic and underlying causes of undernutrition.

Resilience is fundamentally about transformation; changing the very basis on which individuals and households can make decisions that influence their capacity to deal with stresses and shocks. This implies profound change not only in those determinants that the

⁴⁵ <http://www.oecd.org/insights/37966934.pdf>

⁴⁶ *Building Resilience. Social Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery*. Daniel P. Aldrich. The University of Chicago Press, 2012.

⁵⁰ <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTSOCIALCAPITAL/0,,contentMDK:20186612~menuPK:418214~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:401015~isCURL:Y~isCURL:Y~isCURL:Y,00.html>

⁵¹ <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8881.pdf> page 21.

individual or household has direct control over, but also in wider determinants that influence their room for manoeuvre in making decisions. These must include a rebalancing of the power relationships that are crucial in transformation.

From a programming perspective, this might be happening implicitly since the sectors commonly identified as important in resilience-building (livelihoods, social protection, cash transfers) are those that can bring about social transformations and shift (some of) the power dynamics affecting the poorest and most marginalised. From a donor policy perspective, however, insights into the power dimension of resilience do not feature prominently. USAID stands out in highlighting a specific aspect of power (women's empowerment) in its conceptual framework for resilience, and has incorporated measures of social capital into its approach. Similarly, Irish Aid is mindful of the importance of giving the power dynamic, and specifically women's empowerment, prominence in its emerging guidance on resilience.

Women's empowerment is strongly associated with better nutrition and has had increasing attention in the nutrition-sensitive discourse and longer-standing prominence with regard to nutrition-specific actions. It may therefore offer an additional facet of potential synergies between nutrition and resilience.

How can resilience thinking strengthen approaches to nutrition?

The findings from this scoping study point to a number of areas where resilience can bring important added value to nutrition:

- Adding impetus to, and leverage for, nutrition-sensitive programming;
- Bringing greater attention to the lower levels of causality of undernutrition in order to tackle the basic structural and governance changes required to bring about lasting transformation in improved nutrition;
- Adding impetus to designing and developing emergency responses to undernutrition that take on the characteristics of development programmes operating between the peaks of emergencies (most relevant in fragile or chronic emergency contexts); and
- Reconciling, within nutrition, long-standing divisions between, for example, development/emergency approaches, and stunting/wasting or treatment/prevention, and driving more holistic approaches to tackling undernutrition.

Each of these bullet points is loaded with potential in terms of adding impetus to the nutrition agenda, extending the funding options open to nutrition, and promoting greater coherence across different nutrition

approaches. Programmatically, they all offer positive developments.

The potential to support nutrition-sensitive programming is significant. Key, perhaps, are strengthening the analytics that inform nutrition-sensitive (and nutrition-specific) programming and encouraging examination of all levels of potential causal pathways (and not just those at the immediate and underlying levels, as has been the tendency until recently).

Resilience could help strengthen the nutrition agenda by requiring the risks and capacities that play out at the basic level of causality to be taken into consideration more consistently.

A previous narrative review undertaken by the ENN examined the evidence base behind the common divide in programmes that seek to address stunting on the one hand and wasting on the other. "The evidence does not support the current degree of separation of wasting and stunting into acute and chronic conditions or humanitarian and development contexts as both conditions occur over a number of months in an individual child and are found in a variety of contexts."⁵²

Overlap in the risk factors for wasting and stunting calls for coherent approaches so that both can be addressed simultaneously. A resilience approach may be conducive to such holistic thinking and responses.

How can nutrition strengthen approaches to resilience?

Resilience is highly context-specific; it is linked to the specific capacities and constraints of the people, services and systems of concern. The impacts of potential acute hazards and chronic stressors in that context will depend on the vulnerabilities of the populations. Nutrition is commonly a key driver of such vulnerabilities, especially in the contexts chosen for resilience-building efforts⁵³.

One of the criticisms levelled at the resilience discourse is that it has been overly dominated by a 'systems approach' and has paid too little attention to the human angle of weak resilience. By viewing resilience through a nutrition lens, the interconnections between people and systems not only become evident but also become evidently necessary. A number of interviewees thought that this could be one clear benefit brought by nutrition

⁵² See page 26 of: Khara, T., & Dolan, C. (2014). Technical Briefing Paper: *Associations between Wasting and Stunting, policy, programming and research implications*. Emergency Nutrition Network (ENN) June 2014. <http://www.ennonline.net/waststuntreview2014>

⁵³ For example, 45% of the global stunting burden is borne by fragile and conflict-affected states. See *Stunting in the emergency context – what are the issues?* ENN report (in production).

to resilience, since nutrition makes the interconnections between systems and individuals explicit: undernutrition reveals a negative impact on individuals resulting from systems failures.

Another advantage of nutrition revealed in this study is with regard to metrics. The different approaches taken by donors, described earlier, tend to either use (under) nutrition as a criterion for engagement in resilience, or use (improved) nutrition as an outcome of strengthened resilience (USAID and the EU do both). Prevalence estimates of undernutrition (wasting and stunting) are typically used. Use of anthropometric indices could be taken a step further. For example, impact on wasting could be described as seeking a trend of reduction (by x percentage points per year), and/or eliminating fluctuations exceeding five percentage points in a year. Establishing such metrics would allow more sensitive analysis of the impact of resilience programmes than threshold-based interpretations (e.g. wasting prevalence reduced to under 10%).

There is also potential for nutrition to provide more nuanced insights by considering how it can speak to resilience capacities. As a reminder, absorptive capacity can be understood as a (limited) window of opportunity for withstanding a shock or stress; adaptive capacity is a dynamic flexibility to accommodate (temporary) changes; and transformative capacity is a fundamental change that takes place over a longer period of time.

If we examine these three resilience capacities from a nutritional perspective, we begin to see the possibilities for nutrition to inform resilience better, rather than just being treated as an input to or outcome of resilience:

- **Absorptive capacity** could be evidenced by no changes to key nutrition indicators (in the short-term) such as clinical signs of micronutrient status; wasting in infants, children or adults; exclusive breastfeeding; and household dietary diversity.
- **Adaptive capacity** could be evidenced by changes where individuals, households or communities/populations show some improvement in nutritional indices (in the medium term), such as a shorter 'hunger gap' or improved mean weight-for-height in a population. There could also be forms of adaptation, especially at the individual level, that have negative consequences. For example, stunting could be seen as an adaptation to medium and long-term stresses that preserves life and health, but which also carries negative consequences for the longer-term, such as increased risk of non-communicable diseases, reduced productivity, lower educational attainment and increased risk (for females) of having small babies.
- **Transformative capacity** could be evidenced by changes in indicators that show long-term

improvements in the factors causing undernutrition, such as education, gender equality, provision of quality health services and reduced poverty, depending on the nature of vulnerability in a given context.

If resilience is understood as an approach rather than as an objective, then it requires that programmes have resilience integrated (to inform the process of delivery) rather than programmes being designed to 'build resilience'. It does not therefore lend itself to measurement in the same way as typical aid programmes. This point has been made strongly by some commentators⁵⁴. It is also exemplified by UNDP and the World Bank who, in trying to measure resilience as an organisation-wide concern, use a wide range of development indices rather than 'resilience indicators' per se. Thus, resilience is captured as a means to and not the result of effective development.

The challenge of measuring resilience lies in capturing the ability of individuals, households and communities to respond to shocks and stresses and how this response impacts their wellbeing across different time-frames. The nutrition sector, it is argued, can provide additional insights into this.

Lessons of working multi-sectorally

Guidance on resilience emphasises the importance of working across multiple sectors, based on the understanding that there is no single determinant of resilience and that the interplay between various risk factors is as important as any single factor on its own. So too with nutrition, fuelled by clearer evidence that most progress will be achieved only if nutrition becomes an explicit concern of other sectors' programmes.

But doing that has not been easy, and nutrition has been dogged by confusion and limited evidence about what multi-sectoral approaches mean. Is it about having the same population targeted with a number of sectors? Is it about integrating different sectoral programmes (in which case, what does that mean)? Is it about the sequencing of interventions? Is it about having common metrics across different sectoral interventions (so-called common results frameworks (CRF))?

So, although nutrition has not yet got multi-sectoral programming right, it might be useful for those working on resilience to learn from the challenges that nutrition has faced: First, greater clarity is needed on what multi-sector programming actually is (definitional and conceptual); second, far more robust research and evidence is needed to show how, and the extent to

⁵⁴ See Levine, S. 2014: Assessing resilience: why quantification misses the point. HPG Working Paper. <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9049.pdf>

which, nutrition-sensitive programmes impact nutrition (in terms of articulated theories of change as well as robust evidence); third, there are a number of considerations concerning the political economy of multi-sectoral programming: e.g. how do you get different sectors to converge in any given context? What are the conceptual, technical and political barriers to this? Do approaches change where government is devolved?

Despite the dearth of hard evidence concerning which nutrition-sensitive approaches work best, moves are underway to cost the contribution that different sectors can make in reducing undernutrition⁵⁵. This risks deepening the sense of resistance from other sectors that they should be held accountable for impacts in nutrition that they do not feel are their responsibility, and could back-fire in alienating nutrition from other sectors. This scoping study found no evidence that there is a risk of such tensions within the resilience agenda (given its trans-sectoral characteristic and focus on capacities).

Lessons of working through devolved government structures

This area is another example where the nutrition sector is still learning. The process of devolution is still at a relatively early stage and many countries are not yet fully devolved. While there is optimism about the potential benefits that devolution might bring, there are also real concerns that the gains made nationally may wane, in which case momentum would need to be rebuilt through the devolved authorities. For example, it is not always clear what the incentives are for devolved decision-makers to address nutrition (especially if the economic arguments for investing in nutrition are more powerful at the national level), and there is a risk that devolution might increase political interference in tackling and tracking undernutrition.

In some ways, devolved governments need to be understood as particular operating 'contexts' with their particular political economies which are not yet clear (or not yet understood). Positioning nutrition and resilience efforts specifically in such contexts remains a challenge.

Lessons of working across the various levels of causality

As mentioned earlier, the conceptual framework for undernutrition makes explicit the need to tackle all levels of causes and not just those that immediately impact the

status of individuals. For example, over the last five or so years, there has been greater willingness to invest in shaping a socio-economic and political environment for nutrition that is conducive to sustaining the progress possible at the underlying and immediate levels.

However, despite this analytical clarity, nutrition programmes in practice have rarely tackled all levels of causality at the same time. There are several reasons for this:

- Largely it reflects the inadequate attention paid to prevention by the nutrition community; only in recent years has this begun to change. Treatment tended to dominate attention in nutrition until five or so years ago because of significant innovations (such as community-based approaches for the management of wasting) and effective advocacy (e.g. the prominence gained in the 2008 Lancet series).
- Partly it is to do with the 'divide' in approaches linked to stunting and wasting, with the former being tackled at the lower levels of causality, whereas the latter tends to focus more on the immediate causes.
- Partly the increased focus on women and young children (linked to the 1,000 days agenda) has, to some extent, diverted attention away from the basic societal-level causes of undernutrition.

The resilience agenda needs to be wary of such divisions and seek to ensure a robust, holistic platform for investments.

Strengthening accountability

Accountability needs to be incorporated more strongly in the resilience agenda to really help discern the benefits that it brings to international assistance efforts.

Some oversight and scrutiny is called for to ensure that states and donors are held to account for their commitments. In nutrition, there are clear global (and sometimes national) targets that have been agreed; these do not exist in resilience. There is also oversight through the Global Nutrition Report⁵⁶, for which there is no parallel in resilience. Furthermore, there are no common indicators and no consistency in the objectives and outcomes of resilience programmes, so the very basis of developing and strengthening accountability in resilience is lacking.

⁵⁵ Discussed at the SUN Global Gathering 2015 in Milan.

⁵⁶ <http://globalnutritionreport.org/>

Potential next steps

1. Firstly, it would be useful to secure a degree of alignment among the nutrition community on the linkages with resilience across the development and humanitarian arenas. Can the nutrition community agree on core elements for integration in resilience efforts? How can nutrition interventions be designed to be more resilience-sensitive? Perhaps initially, exchanges could be facilitated through an online mechanism such as the ENN's en-net⁵⁷, with follow-up through a discussion forum, such as a joint SUN/Global Nutrition Cluster meeting. The EU (DEVCO/ECHO) or USAID might see merit in supporting such a process.

2. Secondly, donors could usefully consider their role in supporting both facets of strengthened nutrition-resilience linkages: how nutrition could strengthen resilience and how resilience could strengthen nutrition. In particular, the following emerge from this work:

- systematically building in multi-hazard risk assessments to programmes;
- requiring sound causal and context analyses (especially in spanning all levels of causality for undernutrition) to be undertaken; which should then inform:
- more holistic approaches to undernutrition (and less differentiation between stunting and wasting);
- longer-term, more flexible funding;
- consideration of how nutrition indices could illuminate understanding of resilience capacities at the individual, household and population levels; and
- greater attention on the outcomes of programmes rather than outputs.

The OECD might provide a platform for such consideration.

3. Further discussion around the linkages between resilience and nutrition. The findings and ideas raised by this study are but the beginning of a conversation that merits further exploration and expansion; not only among the donors included but also by other actors. Potential fora might be:

- a round-table discussion among donors, perhaps in Geneva or at a meeting of the SUN Donor Network;
- a meeting in the context of BMZ's Resilience Learning Initiative;
- a meeting of the OECD Risk & Resilience Experts Group; and
- a meeting of the Inter-Agency Resilience Learning Group (comprising members of the DFID PPA (Programme Partnership Agreement) Resilience

Learning Group, BOND Disaster Risk Reduction Group and BOND Development and Environment Group).

4. Extend the analysis of nutrition/resilience links to implementation in order to understand the operational implications of resilience on nutrition programming (and vice versa). This would also provide a broader comparison of resilience approaches in order to determine whether integrating nutrition is appropriate in all contexts.

5. Extend the analysis to government actors across all major regions of international development assistance in order to understand their positions and priorities.

This could usefully include closer examination of the added value of risk-pooled financing mechanisms to national resilience efforts and any influence these have had on investments in addressing undernutrition.

6. Examine a cross-section of relevant project proposals to capture processes, actions and metrics that are included in resilience programmes and have links to nutrition – as well as how resilience has influenced nutrition programmes.

To what extent do programming practices reflect the policies and guidance of donors? Is comprehensive analysis of risks consistently undertaken? If so, to what extent does nutrition feature and how does this analysis inform the design of interventions?

7. Establish a detailed and systematic scrutiny of metrics being used in resilience programming and what these tell us about impacts being achieved. DfID has already identified the need to examine the links between measurements of changes in resilience (at the outcome level) with measurements of impact. This would require appropriate methodologies for assessing project contributions to measure changes in wellbeing.

As a first step this idea could be explored with the resilience measurement technical working group (RM TWG) of the Food Security Information Network (FSIN)⁵⁸, which has undertaken numerous studies on resilience measurement.

⁵⁷ <http://www.en-net.org/>

⁵⁸ A global initiative co-sponsored by FAO, WFP and IFPRI. See <http://www.fsincop.net>

Annex 1: Interviewees

	Name	Position	Location
Canada DFATD	Joelle Martin	Senior Policy Advisor, Policy Development Division (Resilience Lead)	Canada
UK DFID	Tim Waites	Senior Livelihoods and Disaster Resilience Adviser, Conflict Humanitarian and Security Department	UK
	Simone Field	Disaster Resilience Adviser, Conflict Humanitarian and Security Department	UK
	Abi Perry	Senior Nutrition Advisor	UK
EU (DEVCO)	Stéphane Devaux	Geographical Coordination for Western Africa Regional Programmes	Belgium
EU (ECHO)	Matthew Keyes	Team Leader, Specific Thematic Policies	Belgium
	Jan Eijkenaer	Former Technical Advisor for Resilience and AGIR	Senegal
	Callum McLean	Regional Food Security Adviser, Nairobi	Kenya
	Roger Bellers	International Aid/Cooperation Officer (seconded from DFID)	Belgium
	Cyprien Fabre	Head of ECHO Regional Office, West Africa	Senegal
	Pauline Clement	Assistante Technique – DFID Reporting, Regional Office, West Africa	Senegal
GIZ	Barbara Abbentheren	Adviser, Transitional Development Assistance	Germany
Irish Aid	Mags Gaynor	Resilience Policy Team Lead	Ireland
OECD	Hugh MacLeman	Policy Advisor, Risk & Resilience	France
USAID	Greg Collins	Bureau of Food Security; Deputy Director of the Resilience Secretariat	USA
	Thibaut Williams	Health Officer, Sahel Regional Technical Office	Senegal
Burkina Faso	Joachim Ouedraogo	Chef de Département Prospectives et Politiques du Secteur Rural (DEPP)	Burkina Faso
Kenya	Valerian Micheni	Drought Information Manager, National Drought Management Authority (NDMA)	Kenya
Niger (3N)	Mamoudou Hassan	AGIR Focal Point, Haut Commissariat à l'Initiative 3N, Présidence de la République	Niger
Niger (ARC)	Yacouba Bako	ARC Focal Point	Niger
Senegal (AGIR)	Mme Cissokho	SECNSA (Executive Secretariat for the National Food Security Council)	Senegal
	Dr Moussa Bakhayokho	Consultant, SECNSA	Senegal
	Massamba Diop	Government Coordinator for ARC, Cabinet of the President (CSA)	Senegal
Independent	Helen Berton	Consultant	Senegal

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Annex 3: Summary of donor positions on resilience

Resilience Definition	Resilience Metrics	Funding (examples)	Geographic focus	Interventions funded	Comments
Canada Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development	The ability of individuals, households, governments, regions, and systems to mitigate, resist, absorb, and recover from the effects of shocks and disasters in a timely, sustainable, and efficient manner. http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImage/Evaluations2/\$file/CIDA-learns-eng.pdf	Canada Fund for African Climate Resilience (launched 2012). Can\$23 million.	Eight African countries	Ten projects through nine partners http://www.international.gc.ca/development-developpement/partners-partenaires/calls-appels/climate-resilience-climatique.aspx?lang=eng	The evaluation of CIDA's humanitarian assistance recommended that CIDA develop a systematic, integrated approach to supporting prevention and risk reduction, as well as recovery and transition to development. The 2012 OECD DAC Peer Review of Canada echoed this finding, suggesting improvements to Canadian efforts in building resilience and supporting post-crisis recovery.
European Union DEVCO and ECHO	The ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks. http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/resilience/com_2012_586_resilience_en.pdf	ECHO introduced a Resilience Marker in Jan 2015. The aim is to ensure that each project systematically considers risks and vulnerabilities, builds local capacity and takes opportunities to reduce humanitarian need in the long-term.	Sep 2015: New €1.8 billion EU Trust Fund for Africa to improve stability and address irregular migration. Resilience integrated. Apr 2015: New €80m EU/AU fund: Building Disaster Resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa. Supports implementation of the African Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy. Resilience integrated. DIPECHO not seen as conducive to building resilience: short time-frames; not predictable; poor continuity (of staff and community links).	Sahel, Lake Chad area, the Horn of Africa and North Africa. SHARE (phase II) will be funded through this.	OECD also discussing the potential merits of introducing a resilience marker like ECHO.

	Resilience Definition	Resilience Metrics	Funding (examples)	Geographic focus	Interventions funded	Comments
Germany Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and GIZ	The ability of people and institutions – be they individuals, households, communities or nations – to deal with acute shocks or chronic burdens (stress) caused by fragility, crises, violent conflicts and extreme natural events, adapting and recovering quickly without jeopardising their medium and long-term future. http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/issues/transitional-development-assistance/index.html	Launched 'Resilience Learning Initiative' in 2014. Capturing lessons from Madagascar, Haiti and Bangladesh from 5 projects funded by the TDA. Findings due Nov 2015.	Transitional Development Assistance (TDA) is a special budget line to bridge humanitarian and development aid. It is the only mention of resilience in German policy. <i>Aim: To increase the resilience of people and institutions to withstand the impact and consequences of crises, violent conflict and extreme natural events while improving the prospects for sustainable development.</i>	Fragile states; Protracted crises; vulnerable countries at high risk of natural hazard and climate change	Infrastructure; DRM; (re)integration of refugees; food and nutrition security	GLZ Capacity Works manual predates resilience discussions in Germany; it is about effective management of Germany's international cooperation. Resilience is implicit within that cooperation, but is rarely labelled that. Resilience discourse is stronger in BMZ than in Federal Foreign Office (which provides emergency aid, transitional humanitarian aid and emergency preparedness). BMZ decision regarding resilience pends outcomes from learning initiative (and possibly influence from international agenda).
Ireland Irish Aid	Resilience is the ability of people and communities, as well as countries, to withstand setbacks such as extreme weather events like flooding, an outbreak of violence, or an unexpected dip in income. Being resilient means you are better prepared, better able to cope, and better placed to recover. https://www.irishaid.ie/media/irishaid/allwebsitemedia/20newsandpublications/publicationpdfsenglish/one-world-one-future-irelands-new-policy.pdf			Resilience is one of three goals in Irish Aid's policy for international development, 'One World One Future'.		Irish Aid has positioned resilience centrally in its international development policy and is in the process of developing guidance for country offices. Seeks to learn from experience of other actors, including OECD.
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development	The ability of individuals, communities and states and their institutions to absorb and recover from shocks, while positively adapting and transforming their structures and means for living in the face of long-term changes and uncertainty. http://www.oecd.org/dac/May%2010%202013%20FINAL%20resilience%20PDF.pdf					Established Experts Group on Risk and Resilience and produced several papers to support donors. Resilience Systems Analysis tool – allows joint analysis and prioritisation of resilience options by step by step approach to holding a multi-stakeholder workshop, designing a roadmap to boost resilience and integrating the results of the analysis into humanitarian and development planning.

	Resilience Definition	Resilience Metrics	Funding (examples)	Geographic focus	Interventions funded	Comments
UK Department for International Development	<p>Disaster Resilience is the ability of countries, communities and households to manage change, by maintaining or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses – such as earthquakes, drought or violent conflict – without compromising their long-term prospects. 2011.</p> <p>https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/186874/defining-disaster-resilience-approach-paper.pdf</p>	<p>Minimum progress indicators were developed by countries to embed resilience in all country programmes by 2015.</p>	<p>£5m catalytic fund managed by CHASE supported embedding process. Trying to increase development funding for resilience and move away from humanitarian. (Multi-year humanitarian funding coincided with embedding process and found helpful).</p>	<p>Embedded resilience in 25 countries in 2 regions.</p>	<p>Strengthened harmonisation of different kinds of programmes, especially between DRR, social protection and climate change adaptation. Requires focus on strengthening institutions.</p>	<p>DfID partners established Inter-Agency Resilience Learning Group to share learning.</p> <p>One DfID paper mentions: “A coalition of interested donors, working through the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative, might be able to work towards better, more consistent and more predictable funding for disaster resilience. This could have both a global dimension (e.g. pooled funds) and an operational dimension (to ensure effective resilience leadership in different disasters)” – but no evidence found of this.</p>
United States USAID	<p>Resilience is the ability of people, households, communities, countries and systems to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth.</p> <p>http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/USAIDResiliencePolicyGuidanceDocument.pdf</p> <p>New USAID Mission Statement: to end extreme poverty and to promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing our security and prosperity.</p> <p>http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/mission-vision-values</p> <p>Key Resilience principles:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build resilience as a common objective; • Create and foster linkages • Enable host country/regional ownership • Focus on the long-term. 	<p>Results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • increased adaptive capacity • improved ability to address and reduce risk • improved social and economic conditions of vulnerable populations. <p>Indicators to measure progress in building resilience = reduction in humanitarian assistance needs; depth of poverty; moderate to severe hunger; and global acute malnutrition.</p>	<p>No specific resilience funding mechanism, use existing streams, e.g. USAID’s RISE initiative (Resilience in the Sahel Enhanced) commenced in 2014. This includes a specific funding commitment in Burkina Faso and Niger (of \$130 million for the first two years) to address the root causes of persistent vulnerability. In four other countries (Senegal, Mali, Mauritania and Chad), RISE leverages existing humanitarian and development assistance to support the AGIR process.</p>	<p>Horn, Sahel, South and SE Asia.</p> <p>Horn and Sahel countries selected based on several criteria, including ‘persistently high acute malnutrition’</p>	<p>Priority components to build adaptive capacity are: livelihood strategies; health & nutrition services; environment, water, sanitation & management; education; and economic opportunities.</p> <p>SPRING is part of RISE.</p>	<p>Integrated humanitarian/development efforts:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Joint problem analysis and objective setting; 2. Intensified, coordinated strategic planning around resilience; 3. Mutually informed project designs and procurements to enable the layering, integrating, and sequencing of humanitarian and development assistance; 4. Robust learning. <p>Have used Joint Planning Cells (JPCs) in the Horn and Sahel.</p>

Annex 4: Resilience 'qualities' that guide donor approaches

	Appropriate	People-centred	Country-owned	Relevant	Equitable	Connected
DFID⁵⁹	Anchored in national and local actors' realities and contexts	Shaped by local understanding and priorities	Country-owned	Iterative, flexible, adaptive approach; Aim to be long-term and collaborative	Support those groups disproportionately impacted (women, children, older and disabled people and politically marginalised groups)	Multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary
EU⁶¹	Needs to be context-appropriate and embedded in national policies and plans	A people-orientated approach	Country-owned and country-led		Bringing sustainable benefits to the most vulnerable populations	Multi-sectoral, multi-level, multi-partner and strategically and jointly planned
USAID⁶¹	Drawing on the ideas, resources, and desires of local stakeholders	Create and foster linkages (across all levels)... responsive and informed by community needs	Country (or regionally) led	Focus on the long-term	Reaching the marginalised and most vulnerable	A common objective across development and humanitarian assistance
IrishAid⁶²	Shocks and stresses at core of analysis; Shared evidence, innovation and learning; Do no harm	Individuals, communities and countries at the centre		Long-term responsive, forward-thinking	Equitable, inclusive growth; analyse vulnerability and gender inequality	Strong, integrated analysis; recognise socio-ecological inter-dependence

⁵⁹ https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/186874/defining-disaster-resilience-approach-paper.pdf, page 15

⁶⁰ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/resilience/com_2013_227_ap_crisis_prone_countries_en.pdf page 3

⁶¹ www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/USAIDResiliencePolicyGuidanceDocument.pdf, page 16

⁶² Draft, personal communication. These draw on principles that Irish Aid is already committed to as well as external guidance.

Annex 5: EU financing mechanisms for resilience

Recent changes in its financial regulations⁶³ allow the EU to set up multi-donor trust funds. This has been enacted at country level (in the Central African Republic) and at continent level in Africa (covering the Sahel, Horn and North Africa).

These two trust funds are financed differently.

First came the trust fund in the Central African Republic in 2014, called the Bêkou Trust Fund⁶⁴. This is funded from a headquarters facility, the Global Public Goods and Challenges Programme (€10 million), and from contributions from France, Germany and the Netherlands. It is designed as a means of improving cooperation across the humanitarian and reconstruction efforts and is framed more around LRRD than resilience.

The Bêkou Trust Fund is one component of a broader portfolio of initiatives under the canopy of Pro-Resilience Action (PRO-ACT)⁶⁵. PRO-ACT totals €70 million and is funded under the Global Public Goods and Challenges Programme to support resilience-building in nine countries⁶⁶. Another component of PRO-ACT is support to AGIR through the OECD/ SWAC.

The EU Trust Fund for Africa was recently approved⁶⁷ and is seen as a significant development, not only because of its size (€1.8 billion) but because it will influence the EU's financial and implementing procedures. Still in design at the time of writing, it is understood to be an EU-wide fund (with contributions from DEVCO, ECHO, DG Migration and Home Affairs), as well as a mechanism to which member states can contribute. It will cover resilience, stability and security and is primarily seen as a way of tackling irregular migration and trafficking, including the current 'migration crisis' in Europe.

⁶³ As of 2013.

http://ec.europa.eu/budget/biblio/documents/regulations/regulations_en.cfm

⁶⁴ https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/bekou-trust-fund-introduction_en

⁶⁵ For a full description of PRO-ACT see page 87 of the funding decision: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/aap-gpgc-food-secur-sust-agric-20141216_en.pdf

⁶⁶ Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Haiti, Lebanon, Mali, Senegal, Somalia and South Sudan.

⁶⁷ See press release of 9 September 2015: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5596_en.htm

Annex 6: Risk-pooling insurance for resilience funding

African Risk Capacity (ARC) is a specialised agency of the AU, linked to a financial affiliate ARC Insurance Company Ltd. If countries meet ARC criteria and join, they then pay a premium into a pool fund. Payouts are made if certain pre-agreed objective indices (rainfall, vegetation coverage, wind speeds, etc) are exceeded. The methodology used is Africa RiskView, a satellite weather surveillance and software system developed by WFP which monitors the indices and triggers funds. The first countries included in the insurance in 2014-15 were Kenya, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. Over \$26 million was paid to the three Sahelian countries.

See <http://www.africanriskcapacity.org>

The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) has 16 member countries: Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago, Turks & Caicos Islands.

See <http://www.ccrif.org/>

The Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (PCRAFI) is a joint initiative of SOPAC/SPC, World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

See <http://pcrafi.spc.int/>

Annex 7: The AGIR⁶⁸ Initiative – Alliance Globale pour l'Initiative Résilience

1. Description

Background

AGIR is a multi-stakeholder collaboration that aims to put resilience higher up the political agenda in the Sahel and West Africa. It is an alliance of 17 countries, West African regional bodies and the OECD committed to working together to accelerate the implementation of the West African regional agenda for food and nutrition security. AGIR is not a new funding mechanism, but rather an improved approach. It is designed to better orient existing institutions and funding streams towards those populations most at risk and to influence the priorities of national budgets⁶⁹.

AGIR emerged from the 2012 crisis in the Sahel, but the impetus was a long-standing concern that repeated humanitarian assistance was not solving the deep-seated causes of crises. AGIR was an attempt to move away from that entrenched pattern and to develop a common understanding of, and approach to, the persistent, root causes of vulnerability in the region.

Approach and objectives

The overall objective of AGIR is to: “Structurally reduce food and nutritional vulnerability in a sustainable manner by supporting the implementation of Sahelian and West African policies” and to eradicate hunger and malnutrition within the next 20 years⁷⁰.

It has four strategic objectives or pillars:

1. Improve social protection for the most vulnerable households and communities in order to secure their livelihoods;
2. Strengthen the nutrition of vulnerable households;
3. Sustainably improve agricultural and food production, the incomes of vulnerable households and their access to food; and
4. Strengthen governance in food and nutritional security.

Set-up and governance

AGIR's governance spans the national, regional and international levels:

- Seventeen West African countries, with particular attention to the eight in the Sahel⁷¹ which experience recurrent food crises and high rates of stunting;

- The economic and monetary bodies for West Africa (ECOWAS and UEMOA⁷²); and
- The OECD⁷³, which offers administrative and organisational support.

The inter-relationship of these and other actors is summarised in figure 2.

AGIR's *international* partners have established a co-ordination platform to help sustain the commitment of the technical and financial partners and to uphold the political interaction between the international community and Sahelian and West African policymakers. All AGIR efforts and initiatives are coordinated through biannual meetings of the RPCA (OECD's Food Crisis Prevention Network). The Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC) provides a platform for dialogue, debate, lobbying and advocacy for the Alliance on the international stage.

ECOWAS and UEMOA are the Alliance's main regional decision-making bodies. Their technical body, CILSS⁷⁴, hosts a technical unit responsible for facilitating the implementation of the AGIR Regional Roadmap. CILSS is supported by SWAC and funded by the EU.

At *country* level, a government AGIR focal point facilitates support to AGIR through existing structures.

⁶⁸ “Agir” means to act in French.

⁶⁹ Nutrition, resilience and the genesis of AGIR. Jan Eijkenaar, Field Exchange, issue 50, ENN August 2015.

⁷⁰ The AGIR website <http://www.oecd.org/site/rpca/agir/> gives access to a number of key documents:

- AGIR Joint declaration on strengthening Resilience, June 2012
- ECOWAS, UEMOA, CILSS, Joint Position, Sept 2012
- AGIR Joint Statement of Ouagadougou, Dec 2012
- AGIR Regional Roadmap, April 2013
- A leaflet on AGIR

http://www.oecd.org/site/rpca/agir/AGIR%20plaquette_EN_pageby page.pdf


⁷¹ Burkina Faso, Chad, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria (North) and Senegal.

⁷² ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States; UEMOA: Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine (West African Economic and Monetary Union) – 8 of the 15 ECOWAS and 3 of the 8 Sahelian countries.

⁷³ Specifically the SWAC (Sahel and West Africa Club) of the OECD.

⁷⁴ *Comité permanent Inter-états de la Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel* (Permanent Interstates Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel). CILSS includes 13 countries working on food security and natural resource management.

Figure 2 The structural set-up of AGIR and flows of influence



2. AGIR at country level: National ambitions

Since January 2014 CILSS and SWAC have provided technical and financial support to country AGIR processes, as defined by their national resilience priorities (NRP). A country's NRP-AGIR document is developed and approved at a high level (e.g. the President's or Prime Minister's office) and builds on existing programmes, structures and mechanisms. In practice, the Alliance aims to mobilise actors and resources to support the implementation of 'resilience' within existing sectoral policies (agriculture, health, education, family planning, social protection, business, investment, etc.).

In each country an AGIR focal point is appointed. Their institutional position varies depending on the origins of the momentum around resilience in each country. For example, in Burkina Faso, the focal point is located in the Ministry of Agriculture; in Senegal, in the National

Food Security Council; in Niger, in the High Commissariat for the 3N Initiative⁷⁵. The focal point is usually attached to a higher-level body that deals with food security or agriculture and reports to the President's or Prime Minister's Office.

Coordination structures and collaboration between sectors and ministries have generally improved as a result of AGIR. In Niger, however, each sector ministry manages its part of the response plan; so, although planning is joint, programme implementation is sector-specific.

⁷⁵ 3N Initiative: People of Niger Feed People of Niger.

3. Analysis

AGIR process and prospects

Although initially the pace of AGIR was rapid during the set-up and planning stages, subsequent implementation has been slower. Reasons for this include: countries have worked at a different pace to develop their NRPs; the technical cell in CILSS took time to establish; and the role of SWAC had to be redefined. This slow-down diminished the profile and visibility of AGIR.

Two and a half years since the launch of the initiative, opinion is mixed as to the gains achieved by AGIR. While some think that the momentum has passed and do not envision that the Alliance will survive for the next 17 years, others think that AGIR is stamped firmly in country and regional processes and cannot be erased easily.

Doing business differently

Working on resilience and changing the mode of humanitarian response was seen as crucial to overcoming the persistent challenges faced by the region: chronically high levels of undernutrition, high population growth (the region's population is anticipated to double by 2050), increasing poverty, climate change, insecurity and migration. Resilience thinking has had some influence, although concrete changes in programming have not yet been felt.

As mentioned by a number of interviewees, AGIR's success probably lies in bringing about a common understanding of the root causes of vulnerability in the Sahel for the first time. AGIR catalysed discussions among governments and development actors regarding the nature of vulnerability in different countries, and highlighted that food production and food availability were not sufficient responses to this vulnerability. The degree to which this understanding has influenced programme design and implementation may need strengthening to ensure that the most vulnerable are targeted⁷⁶.

AGIR's 20-year timeframe is seen as important in signalling when real impact can be expected. Such long-term thinking has changed the perspective of governments in designing their national priorities and programmes.

Although government thinking and planning might have evolved with the resilience agenda, actions have been more difficult to shift. In defining their national resilience priorities, for example, several countries found it a challenge to move away from their usual food crisis response plans (which tend to emphasise mitigation rather than resilience-building). Also, NRPs were not always based on thorough risk analysis.

AGIR has engendered varying levels of ownership among regional stakeholders and national governments. Some have adopted resilience as a priority, while others regard it as a transitory requirement for international funding.

Nutrition within AGIR

On paper, AGIR has a strong nutrition focus but in practice it is dominated by its third pillar, agricultural production. Social protection and nutrition are said to be lesser considerations in resilience programming.

For example, Niger's NRP built on the pre-existing 3N initiative. Social protection and nutrition were eventually included in response to pressure from technical and financial partners. In Burkina Faso and Senegal, however, nutrition was built-in from the outset. Reasons for this difference might include:

1. Burkina Faso and Senegal did not have a prior programme such as the 3N in Niger, so were able to develop their NRP from a fresh, AGIR perspective;
2. In Senegal and Burkina Faso, nutrition enjoyed greater prominence within government than in Niger. In Niger, nutrition is a directorate in the Ministry of Health, whereas in Burkina Faso it is a strong component of the National Council for Food Security and Nutrition (CNSAN) and in Senegal it is linked to the Prime Minister's office.


A key objective in the AGIR framework is to reduce stunting levels to below 20%. Although this target is laudable, it will be very difficult to attribute its realisation to AGIR.

⁷⁶ EU Resilience Compendium. Saving lives and livelihoods. Publication of the European Commission.

Annex 8: Three frameworks for nutrition and resilience


DFID, 2012

Figure 3 Drivers of nutritional risk




FAO, 2014

Figure 4 A framework for action for maximizing the nutritional impact of resilience programmes



FAO, 2014

Figure 5 Nutrition resilience model

Annex 9: Community understanding about resilience

Academics may well have given greater emphasis to the power dynamics of resilience-building than aid practitioners. And one of the ways this has been explored is in assessing communities' understanding of resilience. For example, a network of 17 research institutes⁷⁷, mostly in Africa, have been examining how communities perceive resilience and what they prioritise as changes necessary to give them greater power – to give “communities, households, and individuals greater agency and control in determining development outcomes”⁷⁸.

Findings that were consistent across the various communities surveyed include the following changes as key in enhancing power:

Wealth emerged strongly, both as a cause of poor resilience and as an outcome of vulnerability and shock;

Human capital⁷⁹, and especially **education**, emerged as a critical underlying driver, cause, and outcome of vulnerability for all communities surveyed;

Environment and natural resources were perceived as both a contributor to vulnerability as well as a cause of shocks/stresses. “Its recurrence as a critical dimension of resilience is a function of its close link, in nearly every case, to livelihoods, particularly in communities dependent on agriculture and livestock”⁸⁰; **Governance**⁸¹ was highlighted by all communities as a factor in resilience;

Social capital⁸² has an overall positive impact on resilience in most cases;

Health (of individuals and systems) was most commonly perceived as an outcome of strengthened resilience and nutrition was specifically mentioned in Malawi and the DRC. Health was also understood as a driver of vulnerability in areas with high HIV prevalence.

Security and protection were perceived variously as a core or secondary aspect of resilience.

This research has spotlighted five areas of intervention for strengthening the pathways of resilience; the development of human capital and agency is one of these, “based on the belief in the power and agency of the individual community member as a critical aspect of resilience building and sustainability. Solutions should contain a component for understanding and promoting the community's ‘know-how’ to apply the solution, empowering them to manage their affairs without necessarily always relying on external support, and ensuring access by marginalised groups like women and youth.”⁸³

The other four areas of intervention are: innovations that improve communities' gains in the agricultural sector; diversification of livelihoods; solutions that increase the potential for individuals and households to save for investment and emergencies; and improving access to water (for domestic use, for livestock and livelihood diversification, and water extraction/treatment/storage).

⁷⁷ *The State of African Resilience. Understanding Dimensions of Vulnerability and Adaptation*. A Report from the Resilient Africa Network (RAN), March 2015. <http://www.ranlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/State-of-African-Resilience-Report.pdf>

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, page 9

⁷⁹ The skills, knowledge, labour capacity and level of good health that enable people to pursue different (livelihood) strategies.

⁸⁰ See *The State of African Resilience* page 28.

⁸¹ Activities, processes, and frameworks in which authority (political, economic, or administrative) is exercised to manage the affairs of a country or administrative unit.

⁸² The extent and forms of connectedness among individuals, households and groups, including social and community networks, formal institutions and informal institutions. It includes community inclusion and exclusion.

⁸³ See *The State of African Resilience* page 61.